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Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Judge for the Northern District of*
Illinois, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-1917
KRISTILA CHANDRA
                                  Petitioner
v.
*Attorney General
of the United States,
                                 Respondent
                                                   
(* Amended pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. Pro.)
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(No. A79-304-213)
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 11, 2005
Before:  ALITO and BECKER, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR, District Judge*
(Filed: August 11, 2005 )
OPINION OF THE COURT
Chandra also sought relief before the IJ under the United Nations Convention Against1
Torture.  She did not appeal this issue before the BIA, so we do not address it. 
See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003) (“an alien is required
to raise and exhaust his or her remedies as to each claim or ground for relief if he or she is
to preserve the right of judicial review of that claim”).  
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PER CURIAM:
Kristila Chandra, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of a March
24, 2004, decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming without
opinion the September 23, 2002, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her
applications for asylum and withholding of removal.   When the BIA issues a summary1
affirmance, “the IJ’s opinion effectively becomes the BIA’s, and, accordingly, a court
must review the IJ’s decision.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir.
2001).  Because we write only for the parties, we do not set out the facts.  
We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s denial of Chandra’s asylum application as
untimely.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), (a)(2)(B) (“No court shall have jurisdiction to
review any determination” as to whether “the alien demonstrate[d] by clear and
convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the
alien’s arrival in the United States.”); Tarawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir.
2003) (“the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) clearly deprives us of jurisdiction to
review an IJ’s determination that an asylum petition was not filed within the one year
Section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. Law No. 109-13 (May 11, 2005),2
119 Stat. 231, provides a standard for credibility determinations, but it applies only to
applications filed after the Act’s effective date.  See 119 Stat. at 305 (“The amendments
made by subsections (a)(3), (b), (c), and (d) shall take effect on the date of the enactment
of this division and shall apply to applications for asylum, withholding, or other relief
from removal made on or after such date.”).  
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limitations period, and that such period was not tolled by extraordinary circumstances”).  
We do have jurisdiction to consider the IJ’s denial of Chandra’s withholding of
removal claim, and we hold that the IJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
See Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (adverse credibility determinations
must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence).   The IJ’s thorough oral opinion2
devotes ten pages to credibility analysis, see A.R. 61-70, and we find it persuasive in light
of the record as a whole.  Most importantly, as the IJ noted, Chandra cannot explain the
discrepancy between her I-589 Application (which stated that she was a Buddhist) and her
oral testimony (where she claimed that she was a Christian).  Even if Chandra’s proffered
explanation for this discrepancy were accepted, Chandra still cannot explain why she
could not articulate basic tenets of Christianity.  See, e.g., id. at 63 (“she went as far as to
say that Christians do not believe in communion”; “[s]he could not describe how Christ
died”).  These deficiencies go to the heart of Chandra’s claim that she fears religious
persecution in Indonesia, and are therefore proper grounds for dismissal of her claim.  
At all events, there is no evidence in the record that would compel a reasonable
adjudicator to find that there is a clear probability that Chandra's life or freedom will be
4threatened on account of her religion or ethnicity if she returns to Indonesia.  None of the
incidents described by Chandra rises to the level of persecution (which requires more than
mere harassment or discrimination).  While ethnic Chinese may have been discriminated
against in Indonesia, the State Department reports evidence improved conditions since
Chandra left Indonesia in July 1999.  See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Accordingly, Chandra’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision is denied.  
